A simple case of rationality of escalation

Abstract : Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance an auction), the agents play forever. It is not necessary to consider complex examples to establish its rationality. In particular, the $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game in which escalation arises naturally and rationally. In some sense, it can be considered as the paradigm of escalation. Through an example of economic games, we show the benefit economics can take of coinduction.
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Communication dans un congrès
Reiko Heckel - University of Leicester, UK and Stefan Milius - TU Braunschweig, D. 5th Conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science, CALCO 2013, Sep 2013, Warsaw, Poland. Springer, 8089, pp.191-204, 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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Contributeur : Pierre Lescanne <>
Soumis le : lundi 10 juin 2013 - 17:42:37
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 13:52:40
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mercredi 11 septembre 2013 - 04:15:28

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  • HAL Id : ensl-00832490, version 1
  • ARXIV : 1306.2284

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Pierre Lescanne. A simple case of rationality of escalation. Reiko Heckel - University of Leicester, UK and Stefan Milius - TU Braunschweig, D. 5th Conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science, CALCO 2013, Sep 2013, Warsaw, Poland. Springer, 8089, pp.191-204, 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈ensl-00832490〉

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